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In some elections, getting elected may be as simple as
having a Brown next to a Blair on the same ballot sheet
Pairing Brown with Blair on a ballot paper might have been unthinkable for the Labour party,
yet Michael Marsh, looking at the case of Ireland’s preference voting PR system, illustrates
that the choices voters are faced with in the ballot box may play a stronger role in their choice
of candidates than either their political knowledge or party loyalty and interest.
Where parties dominate government, and the nominations of candidates for legislative office,
the fact that some voters do not appear to structure their electoral choice by one party
presents something of a puzzle. US elections are arranged normally so that many offices are
filled at the same time, with electors choosing occupants for a range of offices from the grand
to the prosaic on a given day. Most voters pick a president and a congressman and more all from the same
party, choosing to vote a ‘straight ticket’, but some do not, opting instead for a ‘split ticket’ with perhaps a
Republican for President and a Democrat for the Senate. As well as being theoretically problematic, such
behaviour may be substantively important as it has consequences for election outcomes. These concepts of
‘straight’ and ‘split’ have travelled beyond the US. Although few countries fill so many offices at the same
time, there are features of electoral arrangements elsewhere that offer parallels. The most widely studied are
probably mixed member systems, where the voter casts a vote for a party list and another for a
representative in a single member district.
Voting in an STV election requires a voter to
indicate a first preference for a candidate. In
Ireland this simply means placing a ‘1’ next to a
candidate’s name. However, voters may
continue, expressing further, lower preferences
between as many candidates as they wish. In
doing so, they are not constrained by the party
labels of candidates. Looking at the Irish
election of 2011, we can try and find some
explanations for split ticket voting.
There are several reasons why this is
worthwhile. The first is that STV provides a
variant on more widely studied cases and so
allows us to further test conventional
explanations for their universality. The second,
as will be explained below, is that certain types
of explanation makes little or no sense in an
STV context because of the differences we have
already explained. Nonetheless, many
alternative explanations are potentially valid.
The opportunity to explore some explanations in a context where some alternative ones cannot hold is
useful, providing if not a semi-experimental environment, at least one in which many alternatives can be
ruled out.
The data used here comes from the Irish election study, which consisted of a post election face–to–face, in–
home survey carried out on a sample of 1853 electors in the few weeks after the February 2011 election.
The results show a majority of electors vote a split–ticket, with the number almost identical for each of the
three parties who fielded multiple candidates in constituencies.
One source of explanation lies in differences between individuals. Partisanship, and the extent to which
voters are attracted by candidates rather than parties are important determinants of straight– and split–ticket
behaviour; there is much less evidence that either behaviour is a consequence of the amount of interest, in
or information about politics.
A second source, and this appears to be more powerful, lies in what people are asked to do in the ballot box,
and in factors connected with the choices they have to make. A voter given just two candidates from his
party with names beginning with the same letter, perhaps in a small constituency, and with both being
incumbents, is much more likely to vote a straight ticket than the voter faced with three non-incumbents
spread out across a long ballot. Parties competing in a mixed member electoral system should then be wary
of the subconscious influences that voters can fall prey to and perhaps not focus on the internal politics of
appearance on the ballot paper. If a party wants to keep its support intact, on the 2011 evidence it pays to
pick a Brown to go with a Blair, and not be tempted to run such candidates in different constituencies or
even, separate them on the ballot sheet – despite their internal politics.
Michael Marsh will be speaking at the next McDougall Trust lunchtime Workshop on Political Representation
Issues, Voting Patterns and Public Opinion:  Analysis from the 2011 Irish National Election Study on 19
October. More details.
